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INTRODUCTION
Understanding and interpreting the value of human life has troubled ethicists,
theologians, philosophers and lawyers since the dawn of time. The extent to which life
should be regarded as intrinsically valuable, weighed against the extrinsic value and
quality-of-life considerations, is one of the most challenging and important legal
questions. Unsurprisingly, the academic literature concerning this dilemma is
voluminous.1 Some prefer to use the language of sanctity of life,2 whereas others
suggest that this is misleading and instead refer to the inviolability of life.3 In their
recent work, Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost introduce a new term that they
1. See inter alia J Keown The Law and Ethics of Medicine: Essays on the Inviolability of Hu-
man Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); R Dworkin Life’s Dominion: an Argument
about Abortion and Euthanasia (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993); J Harris The Value of Life
(London: Routledge, 1985); G Williams The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (London:
Faber and Faber, 1957).
2. See Williams, above n 1.
3. See Keown, above n 1.
* This longer paper was adapted and developed from a short chapter originally published in
an edited book: C Stanton et al (eds) Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in Honour of Margaret
Brazier (London: Routledge, 2016). The work for this paper was supported by the Wellcome
Trust [108858/Z/15/Z].
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suggest may be more appropriate when attempting to navigate the murky waters of the
meaning of life and the value that should be attached to it.4 They suggest that the term
reverence for life should be utilised as an alternative that better reﬂects the nuances
and the realities of the dilemma.5 The language of reverence, it is argued, ‘might
bridge the gaps between the different philosophical attitudes’6 that infuse the debate
concerning the acceptability of various end-of-life decisions. In this paper, we analyse
evolving academic and judicial conceptions regarding the value of life in the context
of dilemmas in end-of-life law.7
The delicate moral and ethical questions that underpin the meaning and value of life
have taken centre stage in a number of recent high-proﬁle cases.8 It is clear from these
cases that judges have sometimes struggled to separate the moral arguments from the
legal ones. Attempting to explain and understand their reasoning by reference to a co-
herent judicial interpretation of the value that should be attached to human life has
therefore become something of a challenge. Brazier and Ost suggest that adopting their
language of reverence for life may be helpful in allowing us to rationalise the judgments
that have touched on end-of-life. They suggest that cases should ‘rest on a strong pre-
sumption in favour of reverence for life’,9 but then further indicate that ‘the presump-
tion is not and should not be irrebuttable’.10
Drawing on the work of Brazier and Ost, this paper explores some of the conceptual
difﬁculties inherent in assessing the value and importance that one should attach to
human life. We assess how judges have come to understand and interpret the meaning
and value of life by reference to a number of recent cases involving withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). While these cases clearly
raise different legal questions, resolving the profound disquiet over the value of life
within all such decisions is a fundamental priority. Our analysis exposes some of
the problems that have been left in the wake of contemporary case-law, before identi-
fying certain situations in which it may be possible to end life without offending cer-
tain core values and beliefs. We conclude by arguing that a more coherent and ethically
consistent approach can and should be developed by means of the reverence principle.
The principles of dignity and autonomy demand that a more consistent and principled
approach is taken to identifying the circumstances that might rebut the presumption of
preservation of life. While we do not have the space to examine in detail exactly when
the presumption should be rebutted in every case, we suggest a starting point for a
more productive and effective debate. Consequently, it is clear that the language of
4. MBrazier and S Ost Bioethics,Medicine and the Criminal Law Volume 3:Medicine and Bio-
ethics in the Theatre of the Criminal Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
5. Ibid, p 89.
6. Ibid.
7. ‘End-of-life law’ encompasses both criminal and medical law principles. See J Coggon
‘Assisted dying and the context of debate: “medical law” versus “end-of-life law” (2010) 18
Med L Rev 541.
8. See, in particular, M v N and Others [2015] EWCOP 76; (2015) 18 CCL Rep 603; R
(Nicklinson and Another) v Ministry of Justice, R (AM (AP)) v DPP [2014] UKSC 38; [2014]
3 WLR 200; Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67;
[2014] AC 591; W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam); [2012] 1 WLR 1653; R (Purdy) v DPP
[2009] UKHL 45; [2010] 1AC 345; Pretty v United Kingdom (2346 / 02) [2002] 2 FLR 45;
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
9. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, pp 90–91.
10. Ibid.
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sanctity and/or inviolability presents a barrier to resolving the intractable tensions over
this issue and thus, we argue, reverence for life is capable of capturing a workable
compromise.
CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF
HUMAN LIFE
One of the main problems when discussing the value of human life is the eclectic
terminology that pervades the debate. The term ‘sanctity of life’ is commonly used in
the literature and also in the case-law.11 This, as Brazier and Ost point out, is a
‘misnomer as a description of how the criminal process in England does and should
approach the value of lives’.12 Sanctity of life evokes strong religious connotations that
do not sit squarely with modern conceptions of the role, aim and purpose of the criminal
law. As Jackson states, the ‘idea that God alone should have the power to decide the
moment of an individual’s death’13 is incongruous in a society that is no longer
dominated by religious values and beliefs. The vernacular of sanctity has a tendency
to give the impression that life should be preserved at all costs, a belief that is sometimes
referred to as vitalism.14 In view of the sanctity of life being so closely aligned with re-
ligious beliefs, it has become possible for legal scholars to hone in on its weaknesses,
identifying the fact that religion no longer dictates the contours of the criminal
law.15 Thus, proponents of the intrinsic value of human life who deploy the language
of sanctity to argue against allowing regulated assisted dying, for example, are imme-
diately placed on the back foot.
Supporters of vitalism aside, very few scholars have tried to articulate an argument
that supports preservation of life at all costs. Keown embraces the term ‘inviolability
of life’,16 which for him removes the debate from the domain of religion and places
it within the framework of the common law and human rights by recognising the intrin-
sic value of life itself. This allows Keown to construct a robust argument against
allowing doctors to intentionally kill patients, which, he claims, is not based in religion,
nor is inconsistent with fundamental principles of law. His criticism of those who elide
the concepts of sanctity and inviolability is that they ignore key principles that are
crucial to the sustainability of his argument.17
The key principle is that the inviolability of life prohibits intentional killing by act
or omission. It follows that a doctor cannot intentionally shorten the life of his pa-
tient by undertaking a positive act to accelerate death, and equally is prohibited from
withholding or withdrawing treatment, with the intent to shorten life.18 Accordingly,
Brazier and Ost seek to distance themselves from the language of inviolability be-
cause they suggest it is ‘a more absolute command allowing no exception’.19 Yet
11. In terms of the literature, see in particular Williams, above n 1. The sanctity of human life is
discussed at length in the House of Lords’ decision in Bland, above n 8. More recently, see the
judgment of Lord Neuberger in Nicklinson, above n 8, at [90]–[98].
12. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, pp 83–84.
13. E Jackson and J Keown Debating Euthanasia (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) p 37.
14. Keown, above n 1, p 4.
15. Williams, above n 1.
16. Keown, above n 1, at 5–22.
17. Ibid, at 13–16, 332–335.
18. Ibid, at 12.
19. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, p 89.
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if one remains true to the inviolability ideology, this may not be an accurate interpre-
tation. While the inviolability of life principle recognises no exceptions, it is perhaps
misleading to say it is absolute in the sense that it holds that life should be preserved
at all costs. The inviolability of life principle, as conventionally understood, permits
the withholding and withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment that is not worthwhile
because it is futile or too burdensome for the patient. Thus, even though it would be
wrong to withhold treatment because the patient’s life was thought to be worthless, it
would be acceptable to withhold treatment based on the fact that the treatment itself
was deemed to be worthless, provided that the only intention of the doctor in with-
drawing or withholding the treatment was to alleviate the patient’s pain and suffer-
ing, with death being a foreseen consequence of that act.20 This position was
described by David Price as a ‘sop’,21 in which Keown concedes some ground where
a patient is being sustained in the most hopeless of situations, while at the same time
enabling him to present what is, prima facie, an internally consistent argument that,
in real terms, maintains an unduly restrictive approach to end-of-life decision
making.
There are other more pragmatic concerns. First, the inviolability principle holds the
doctrine of double effect in too high a regard, without considering the practical impli-
cations of the House of Lords’ decision in R vWoollin.22 There are now some situations
in which foresight of a virtually certain consequence may amount to intent and, as this
question rests on the interpretation of a jury, any doctor seeking to rely on the double
effect must surely be advised that she is traversing the most uncertain of legal terrains.
Secondly, determining the question of futility is not straightforward. For every convinc-
ing argument in favour of suggesting that a treatment is in fact futile, a convincing coun-
terargument can be raised.23 This allows the supporters of the inviolability principle to
argue the case for justiﬁably sustaining a patient in a given situation. Finally, where the
question converges on ‘treatment’, there is always room for disagreement as to what
may actually amount to treatment.24 Nonetheless, in theory at least, the inviolability
principle is only absolute in the sense of the intrinsic value it affords to human life itself,
but is not absolute in that it does not rule out withdrawal of treatment completely in
certain types of cases.
The cases in which the inviolability principle would condone certain end-of-life
decisions made by doctors are narrow and thus perhaps too restrictive. Some scholars
therefore encourage the assessment of quality-of-life considerations when determining
end-of-life questions.25
The contrasting view offered in resistance to Keown is that the value of life is self-
determined. Singer, for example, would suggest that a patient who is suffering from a
terminal and/or degenerative illness should have the right to harbour her own view
on the value of life and, as such, any right to life should not be enforced on her,
20. Keown, above n 1, p 12.
21. D Price ‘Fairly Bland: an alternative view of a supposed new “death ethic” and the BMA
guidelines’ (2001) 21 Legal Stud 618 at 638.
22. R v Woollin [1999] 1AC 82.
23. See, amongst others, RKMohindra ‘Medical futility: a conceptual model’ (2007) 33 J Med
Ethics 71; NS Jecker and RA Pearlman ‘Medical futility: who decides?’ (1992) 152 Arch Intern
Med 1140; See also Sir Alan Ward’s analysis in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust v David James and Others [2013] EWCA Civ 65 at [35].
24. For discussion, see Keown, above n 1, pp 330–332.
25. See Jackson and Keown, above n 13; and also Harris, above n 1.
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mandating her to live against her will.26 Harris holds a corresponding view and
suggests ‘killing a person is only wrong when it deprives the person of something it
values: there is no such wrong if the person no longer values life’.27 Rachels frames
a similar argument, albeit in a slightly different way. He suggests that life ought to be
protected in a biographical sense, and not merely in a biological sense. Thus, ‘from
the point of view of the living individual, there is nothing important about being alive
except that it enables one to have a life. In the absence of a conscious life, it is of no
consequence to the subject himself whether he lives or dies.’28 Writers such as Singer,
Harris and Rachels therefore believe that life is only of instrumental value, and that the
worth of life ought to be self-determined.
In framing their arguments in the above way, these scholars attempt to eschew the
problems associated with any objective evaluation of quality of life. Where objective
considerations creep into the equation, there is the risk that certain types of life will
be signiﬁcantly devalued. Thus, for example, there may be a tendency for someone
looking through the lens of objectivity to suggest that the life of a severely disabled per-
son has no worth, value or quality. Ergo, it ought to be more readily acceptable to pre-
maturely end that life. The difﬁculty is that this view signiﬁcantly undermines the
position of disabled people in society, because they may be left with a feeling that their
existence is worth less than that of an able-bodied person. Thus, those opposed to any
relaxation of the law in respect of PAS are quick to point out the dangers that naturally
ﬂow from calculations about quality of life made from an objective perspective.
Scholars such as Singer and Harris therefore remain resolute in their view that the
value of life ought to be self-determined, and that this is the strongest position from
which to argue the case for legal reform. These perspectives are perhaps illustrated
by reference to the widely reported plight of Dan James, a story that attracted wide-
spread media attention in the build-up to the House of Lords’ decision in Purdy. Dan
James was involved in a rugby ground training accident and was unfortunately rendered
tetraplegic as a result. After a number of unsuccessful suicide attempts, he eventually
travelled to Dignitas in Switzerland, with the assistance of his parents, where he
received help to end his life. After investigating the case, the DPP decided not to pros-
ecute his parents, and a family friend, for the role they played in helping Dan James
realise his wish to die.29
The temptation from some objective observers may well be to agree that Dan James
was justiﬁed in making the decision that he did because there was no value in his life
once he became permanently and irreversibly paralysed. However, some other objec-
tive observers may have an entirely opposite view. There may be those who suffer from
a disability themselves – or, indeed, able-bodied individuals – who would recognise
worth in such a disabled life and who would argue that it remains a life worth living.
An important concern for these individuals is that if it becomes acceptable to justiﬁably
end a life, based solely on the grounds of disability, then a dangerous message is
26. P Singer Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1993) at
194–196.
27. J Harris ‘Euthanasia and the value of life’ in J Keown (ed) Euthanasia Examined: Ethical,
Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp 10, 20.
28. J Rachels The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986) p 26.
29. For a discussion of the DPP’s decision not to prosecute, see http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/
articles/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/ (accessed 14 February 2016). See also Purdy,
above n 8.
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conveyed to those with a disability. Moreover, occurrences of assisted suicide might
escalate and perhaps spiral out of control.
Maintaining that the value of life ought to be self-determined avoids some of the
difﬁculties encountered by objective generalisations, which may devalue certain types
of life. Thus, it could be argued that assessing the value of Dan James’ life, through the
lens of Dan James himself, is the correct way in which to determine the worth of life. If
asked, before his accident, Dan James undoubtedly would have testiﬁed to the fact that
his life had quality, and that for him it was well worth continuing to live. However, after
his tragic accident, viewed from his own perspective, this changed. His existence no
longer had sufﬁcient quality and value, to him. As such, he was justiﬁably entitled to
make a decision to die, and should have been legally allowed to receive help.
At this stage, a number of issues become visible. First, whichever perspective is
adopted, there is no one formula for reaching a view on the value of life and,30 as
Huxtable has incisively observed, there is no escaping the fact that in some situations
in reality what is being claimed is ‘that a patient enduring a poor quality existence might
be better off dead’.31 This, of course, is anathema to scholars such as Keown and thus a
pattern emerges in which it becomes evident that views pertaining to the value of life,
and the desirability of being able to choose the manner and timing of one’s death, and in
some instances to receive assistance in doing so, are polarised.
Secondly, different issues are at stake in different types of cases. On one view, argu-
ments about reverence and a rebuttable presumption in favour of life seem perhaps more
plausible where the patient lacks capacity to express a view about the worth of their own
life, as opposed to a situation in which a patient is able to express their own views about
the importance they attach to their life. In the latter, one may intuitively think that
conceptions of autonomy ought to be afforded greater priority and can do all the work,
but this offers too simplistic a view of the relationship between the law per se and
autonomy, and we penetrate deeper into this point as our analysis progresses. At
present, though, it sufﬁces to say that we acknowledge that different issues are in play
where the patient lacks volition. Nevertheless, we also suggest later in the piece that,
while our arguments may be stronger in PVS/MCS cases, the concept of reverence also
has a role to play in situations where active assistance is sought.
Before we move on to consider how Brazier and Ost’s use of ‘reverence’ may
usefully adopt a middle ground between two extreme positions, it is ﬁrst necessary to
explore the origins of the concept itself.
REVERENCE FOR LIFE: EXPLORING THE TERM
Brazier and Ost do not claim ownership rights of the term ‘reverence for life’. Albert
Schweitzer introduced the phrase itself into modern ethical discourse.32 His notion of
reverence for life was born out of a quest ‘to ﬁnd the elementary and universal
concept of the ethical’, which he ‘had not discovered in any philosophy’.33 The ethic
30. For discussion, see J De Haan ‘The ethics of euthanasia: advocates’ perspectives’ (2002) 16
Bioethics 154 at 171; R Huxtable andMMoller ‘“Setting a principled boundary”? euthanasia as a
response to “life fatigue”’ (2007) 21 Bioethics 117.
31. R Huxtable Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: from Conﬂict to Compromise (London:
Routledge Cavendish, 2007) p 15.
32. A Schweitzer The Teaching of Reverence for Life (London: Peter Owen, 1966).
33. A Schweitzer Out of My Life and Thought: an Autobiography, tr AB Lemke (New York:
Henry Holt, 1990) pp 154–155.
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itself contains a multifaceted set of tenets, yet a central theme is that the principle of rev-
erence for life recognises ‘as good only the preserving and beneﬁting of life: any injury
to, and destruction of, life, unless it is imposed upon us by fate, is regarded as
evil’.34 Thus, it is argued that ‘in every case we must decide ourselves to what extent
we may remain ethical and to what extent we will have to bow to the necessity of
harming and destroying a life, and thereby incurring the guilt of such actions’.35
On one level, then, it may seem perplexing that Brazier and Ost have sought to
reintroduce a term into the value of life debate that has hitherto been understood as
not having ‘a large stock of compromises’ and is premised on a gripping ‘desire to
preserve and beneﬁt life’.36 While it is true that there are elements of Schweitzer’s phi-
losophy that acknowledge the importance of compassion and the justiﬁed ending of a
life out of necessity in certain situations, his acceptance that some ethical activity
may entail killing extends only to non-human life. Indeed, a criticism of his thesis is that
his notion of compassionate ending of life does not extend to humans37 , which is en-
capsulated in the two statements that ‘reverence for life orders us not to take even the…
agonizing life of man’ and ‘with a suffering person … I ought not to shorten his life
even by an hour’.38 It follows that some considered reﬂection is required as to how,
if indeed at all, the concept of reverence for life, as used by Brazier and Ost, can be dif-
ferentiated from the traditional understanding associated with Schweitzer’s philosophy.
Brazier and Ost, while acknowledging the origins of reverence for life as being
grounded in the work of Schweitzer, submit that they do not intend to ‘use the phrase
to reﬂect in full Schweitzer’s central ethic’.39 However, while they do state that they
share his emphasis on the intrinsic value of all life, they do not elaborate to any great
extent on the major differences in their usage of the term.40 It is crucial to articulate
these differences in order that Brazier and Ost do not get accused of merely reinventing
the wheel, or that the term they are relying on does not capture accurately the message
that they are attempting to convey.
A key aim of Brazier and Ost in employing reverence is to remove the debate from
the domain of religion, at least to an extent. There may be a degree of scepticism as to
whether or not this objective is actually met. Reverence, it is argued, ‘lacks the conno-
tations of “holiness” inherent in sanctity, and the rather exclusive connections that link
sanctity to Christianity’.41 This may well be true, but the author’s themselves concede
that reverence also carries with it ‘religious overtones’.42 Moreover, if one looks to the
original philosophy of reverence, while there is some debate about it, it has been pointed
out by one prominent scholar that Schweitzer’s reverence for life has a ‘religious
character’ and contains the ‘surmising and longings of all deep religiousness’.43 Does
34. Schweitzer, above n 32, p 31.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. See AP Barsam Reverence for Life: Albert Schweitzer’s Great Contribution to Ethical
Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp 36–37.
38. A Schweitzer A Place for Revelation: Sermons on Reverence for Life, ed M Strege and L
Stiehm, tr DL Holland (London: Macmillan, 1988) p 37.
39. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, p 89.
40. Ibid. The authors simply state that it will become ‘apparent’ that they do not intend to use
the phrase in the same way as Schweitzer.
41. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, p 90.
42. Ibid.
43. See Barsam, above n 37, p 30. See also Schweitzer, above n 33, p 237.
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the subtle linguistic variance of reverence really alter anything, then, by departing from
the holiness of sanctity, and the more restrictive position of inviolability, or is it just
being deployed as a smokescreen by Brazier and Ost, serving as little more than an
agreeable term used to mediate between their own differences of opinion concerning
the law in regard to end-of-life decision making? We agree that the manner in which
Brazier and Ost propose to use reverence is inherently different to the classic philoso-
phy of Schweitzer and we also agree that it could actually make a practical difference in
cases that touch on end-of-life issues. However, in order to make that difference more
pronounced, it is perhaps more appropriate to concentrate on the substance behind the
language of Brazier and Ost’s reverence in addition to focusing on the language itself.
Brazier and Ost suggest that in adopting the term ‘reverence for life’, their aim is not to
answer all the questions. In actual fact, once again, this attitude is not dissimilar from at
least one reading of Schweitzer’s original philosophy, which suggests that reverence is
not meant to establish speciﬁc rules for each possible circumstance, but is more
concernedwith creating a general attitude of universal reverence.44 To this end, both clas-
sical and contemporary uses of reverence bear at least some resemblance. Nevertheless,
the two ideas do diverge. Whereas Schweitzer was concerned with developing reverence
as a universal ethic, Brazier and Ost are more concerned with ‘offering a framework in
which the role of the criminal process can be located’.45 Remaining cognisant of the fact
that reverence is being used here only as a framework is vital, as it allows us to consider
carefully the entwined relationship between the value of life, the law and autonomy. It
becomes especially pertinent to the argument that we construct later in this piece that
reverence has a role to play not only in withdrawal of treatment cases, but also in active
assistance cases. A relevant question at this stage, though, is how Brazier and Ost envis-
age the operation of this framework, as this marks out the most obvious departure from
Schweitzer’s philosophy and where the greatest potential for impact could be achieved.
Whereas both Schweitzer, and Brazier and Ost, share the sentiment of the intrinsic
value of all life, Brazier and Ost’s point of departure rests on the notion of a rebuttable
presumption. In regard to human life, Schweitzer would seemingly reject any notion of
being able to rebut the intrinsic value of life and for him it would be unethical, and ab-
horrent, to ever foreshorten human life, no matter what the circumstances. Brazier and
Ost’s proposal, however, focuses on a presumption in favour of reverence for life, by
which they recognise the intrinsic value of human life itself. Yet, they concede that this
presumption is capable of being rebutted, and indeed should be in appropriate
circumstances.46 Their use of reverence for life would thus permit the ending of human
life in certain situations, if the facts of a given scenario were so compelling so as to pro-
vide convincing evidence that any emphasis placed on the intrinsic value of life was ca-
pable of being outweighed by competing factors that ought to allow the law some room
tomanoeuvre away from the absolute position that life needs to be preserved at all costs.
Used in this way, reverence contains the hallmarks of a type of compromise, and so a
picture begins to emerge in which the midpoint of reverence could have the potential
to impact upon the outcome of certain cases. The systematised use of the term could de-
velop a more principled approach in which judges’ minds are more focused upon the
delicate balance that needs to be struck when questions are at stake concerning the
end of life. It may cause them to become more sensitised to the issues by, on the one
hand, not losing sight of the importance of the intrinsic value of life and, on the other,
44. See Barsam, ibid, p 40.
45. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, p 90.
46. Ibid, p 91.
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developing an acute awareness that it should not be afforded absolute priority in every
given case and that certain factors are capable of overriding it.
It is not the ﬁrst time that the idea of compromise per se has been posited in the ﬁeld
of end-of-life decision making,47 but the aspect of Brazier and Ost’s work that marks it
out as being especially interesting is the manner in which they feel compromise could
be achieved and the evidence that would be required in order to rebut the presumption.
In order to assess how the term ‘reverence for life’ may have been effectively relied
upon in the recent case-law concerning the meaning and value of human life, it is ﬁrst
helpful to consider why it may be more appropriate, and in turn effective, to consider
things from the perspective of a rebuttable presumption.
ACCOMMODATION, EXCEPTION OR REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION?
Those who remain committed to the inviolability of life principle have always been
critical of the House of Lords’ decision to sanction the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment in Bland.48 Throughout its protracted lifespan, judges in the various courts
in which the case was heard sought to reassure us that their decision did not cast off
the intrinsic value that the law has always placed on life. For example, Hoffmann LJ
(as he then was) in the Court of Appeal declared:
In my view the choice the law makers must reassure people that the courts do have
full respect for life, but they do not pursue the principle to the point at which it has
become almost empty of any real content and when it involves the sacriﬁce of other
important values such as human dignity and freedom of choice.49
The criticism of the decision, it is claimed, is based on the reasoning and not the out-
come. Keown suggests that their Lordships focused their minds on the wrong question
when they considered whether the patient’s life itself was worthwhile, rather than
assessing the question of whether or not the treatment being provided was worthwhile.
He argues that the correct questions that should be asked in withdrawal cases are: ‘is
tube-feeding “treatment” and, if so, is it worthwhile?’50 However, even if these
‘correct’ questions had been asked in Bland, there is still a convincing argument that
the treatment should still have been withdrawn. Yet, would the supporters of the invi-
olability of life ever truly admit this and accept Bland for the common-sense and
humane decision that it was? One suspects not. The argument would undoubtedly have
been put forward that the artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration (ANH) was not treatment but
rather ‘basic care’ that can never be withdrawn, or if ANH is treatment, that the
threshold for futility ought to be incredibly high and was therefore not met.
To suggest that ANH is not medical treatment is a particularly weak argument that
has been dismissed judicially,51 yet, for the interpretational reasons noted earlier, the
futility question is delicately poised and difﬁcult to deal with. The issue becomes even
more vexed when considering futility from the perspective of beneﬁts versus
47. For an alternative and interesting discussion, see R Huxtable Law, Ethics and Compromise
at the Limits of Life: to Treat or Not to Treat? (London: Routledge, 2013).
48. Bland, above n 8. For a general critique, see Keown, above n 1.
49. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1992) WL 896030; (1992) 142 NLJ 1755, per Hoffmann LJ
(as he then was).
50. Keown, above n 1, p 340.
51. Bland, above n 8.
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burdens.52 In many respects, the assessment of the beneﬁts versus burdens of treatment
is actually a useful starting point in the context of assessing futility, but some would
argue the calculation should not be conﬁned solely to treatment per se, and so the
assessment of beneﬁts and burdens will not always be as clear-cut as it was in Bland.
In recent times, the courts have been faced with a number of challenging scenarios.
Where the patient is in a minimally conscious state (MCS), the assessment of futility de-
mands a more detailed forensic examination from a judge. The fact that the patient is re-
ceiving some beneﬁt from the treatment is much easier to identify than in, say, a patient
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), but whether or not the burdens of the treatment out-
weigh the beneﬁts is a different matter. In cases such asW v M and Aintree,53 explored in
more detail below, judges have adopted varied approaches to the question of futility, with
some placing emphasis on only the beneﬁts of treatment as a reason for preserving life, and
others implementing amore expansive balancing exercise yielding a rather different result.
To categorise the withdrawal of treatment cases as exceptions to the inviolability of
life principle may be misleading. Its supporters would simply suggest that, if correctly
reasoned, withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment where the treatment itself is deemed
futile is not ruled out and can thus be accommodated within the principle. Judges have
nonetheless been slow to explain and justify the decisions in which they have permitted
withdrawal of treatment by reference to acting within the margin of acceptability
recognised by the classic inviolability principle. Equally, the situations in which they
could actually do so, if they thought it appropriate, are limited to withdrawal type cases
and, for this reason, it may be necessary to identify actual exceptions to the fundamental
belief that recognises the intrinsic value of life.
As noted above, inclusive of, but not limited to, withdrawal of treatment cases, there
are those at the opposite end of the spectrum to the inviolability principle who suggest it
is appropriate to consider factors pertaining to the patient’s quality of life.54 From this
reasoning a strong argument emerges in favour of greater ﬂexibility within the law that
not only allows passive withdrawal of treatment, but also the intentional and active
shortening of a patient’s life in certain circumstances. This approach is still problematic
for some though, as to distance oneself from recognising any intrinsic value to human
life is too radical a step.55
In view of this, Brazier and Ost’s suggestion of a rebuttable presumption in favour of
the intrinsic value of life, in the form of reverence for life, could act as a happy
medium.56 Whether or not one chooses to view it as an advantage or disadvantage,
reverence would certainly be wider in scope than the permissible withdrawal scenarios
accommodated within the inviolability principle; it could conceivably be extended to
permit active intervention, encompassing cases such as Pretty, Purdy and, more
recently, Nicklinson.57 Tensions will naturally surround the concept of a ‘rebuttable
presumption’. Some thought would need to be given to the precise nature and type of
evidence that may be required in order to rebut the presumption in favour of reverence
for life. There would need to be convincing evidence that the plight of the patient did
52. This approach is actually advocated by Keown, above n 1.
53. W v M; Aintree, above n 8.
54. See discussion above at pp 6–8. In particular, see L Doyal ‘Dignity in dying should include
the legalisation of non-voluntary euthanasia’ (2006) 1 Clin Ethics 65; Singer, above n 26.
55. Indeed, this would seem to be a key reason as to why Brazier and Ost have sought to de-
velop their reverence for life argument.
56. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, at 90–91.
57. Pretty, Purdy and Nicklinson, above n 8.
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fall within one of those ‘hard’ cases in which there was a solid justiﬁcation for permit-
ting a patient’s life to be shortened, whether by passive omission or active assistance,
and regardless of whether it was accompanied by a direct intention to shorten life.
Identifying those ‘hard’ cases is where the difﬁculty will lie, but certainly the recent de-
cisions in W v M, Aintree and Nicklinson,58 to which we now turn our attention, are
strong candidates for falling within this category. The legal determinations required
in Aintree, for example, compared to Nicklinson,59 are, of course, palpably distinct.
Yet within all these cases the question over the extent to which the law can, and should,
allow medical interventions (acts or omissions) that intentionally cause death, is a fun-
damental concern. For this reason, we suggest that the reverence principle is capable of
enhancing the resolution of all such cases that involve medical matters of life and death.
RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VALUE OF LIFE
The following cases compelled members of the judiciary to consider how the ‘sanctity’
principle should be weighed against other factors, principles and laws. We assess how
the presumption that human life has intrinsic value was regarded in the context, and
against the conﬂicting issues, of each case.
(a)W v M
In this case, Baker J prioritised the sanctity of life in the face of compelling evidence
that M, who was minimally conscious, would not wish to be kept alive in such a
condition. We have both (separately) argued that this narrow evaluation gave too much
weight to the intrinsic value of M’s life in the best interests balancing exercise,60 while
giving too little weight to her past wishes and feelings,61 the views of her family62 and
also the grim reality of life at the lower limits of MCS. In the absence of a legally
binding advance decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment (AD), which would have
rebutted the presumption of preserving life, Baker J felt that the evidence of M’s sister
and partner regarding M’s wishes (that she would not wish to be kept alive in a state of
total dependency), was insufﬁcient to justify withdrawing ANH. The main reason given
was that in contrast to a person in a vegetative state, a minimally conscious person is
capable of experiencing life, whatever that might mean for that person.63 However,
58. W v M; Aintree; Nicklinson, above n 8.
59. Ibid.
60. See R Heywood ‘Withdrawal of treatment from minimally conscious patients’ (2012) 7(1)
Clin Ethics 10–16; A Mullock ‘Deciding the fate of a minimally conscious patient: an unsatis-
factory balancing act? (2012) 20(3) Med L Rev 460–469; AMullock ‘Best interests and the sanc-
tity of life after W v M’ (2013) 39(9) J Med Ethics 553–554.
61. Section 4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires the decision maker to ‘consider, as
far as reasonably ascertainable, the person’s past and present wishes and feelings … and the
beliefs and values that would be likely to inﬂuence his decision …’
62. Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 4(7). For an interesting discussion, see S Halliday, C Kitzinger
and J Kitzinger ‘Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of chronic disorders of con-
sciousness’ (2015) 35(1) Legal Stud 55–74.
63. The evidence produced painted a very uncertain picture about M’s quality of life, including
evidence of suffering, distress and some contentment. Some have questioned the assumption that
something is better than nothing in this context. See eg S Ashwal and R Cranford ‘The minimally
conscious state in children’ (2002) 9 Seminars in Pediatric Neurology 19.
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Baker J indicated that the presumption in favour of preserving life should only (deﬁ-
nitely) continue if M’s clinical condition remained stable. He intimated that if future,
even trivial, infection threatens M’s life, it might be appropriate not to treat her. This
tells us that the presumption can be highly opportunistic and will often depend upon
the means of achieving death, a phenomenon that has been considered by Kitzinger
and Kitzinger, regarding the ‘window of opportunity’ for allowing death in.64
Accordingly, for Baker J, the appropriate window for rebutting the presumption for pre-
serving M’s life in the absence of a binding AD would be if an infection struck and the
treatment to be withheld is not ANH, or at least not only ANH.
(b) Aintree
Again, this case concerned a best interests evaluation in order to determine whether
treatment should be withheld for a patient in MCS.65 Unlike M, however, the
evidence suggested that the patient, David James, initially experienced a greater
degree of consciousness before rapidly deteriorating to the point at which death seemed
imminent. At the point at which he had a sufﬁcient degree of response and awareness,
the evidence indicated that he might have expressed a wish for treatment to continue in
order to prolong his life. With or without treatment, however, the clinical evidence in-
dicated that Mr James was approaching the end of life, and indeed he died before the
Supreme Court considered his case. Considering the decision of Jackson J in the Court
of Protection, (broadly) in favour of continuing treatment,66 and the subsequent Court
of Appeal decision that overturned Jackson J’s decision,67 the Supreme Court sat as a
panel of ﬁve,68 reaching a unanimous decision delivered by Lady Hale.
Conﬁrming that the ‘strong presumption that it is in a person’s best interests to stay
alive’69 is not an absolute position, Lady Hale scrutinised the approach to the best
interests test in order to establish a more coherent principle regarding its possible re-
buttal. Lady Hale agreed with the Court of Appeal’s decision that it was not in Mr
James’ best interests to have the treatments because by the time the case had reached
them his health had signiﬁcantly deteriorated. Yet, she held that their reasoning and
approach to the best interests test had been wrong. Rather, Jackson J had been correct
in his broad approach, which considered the question of futility from a subjective
rather than primarily objective perspective, taking greater account of the patient’s ap-
parent wishes and what he might regard as a worthwhile treatment. Thus, a treatment
that delivers ‘some beneﬁt’ to the patient, even if it does not affect the underlying
disease, might be regarded as worthwhile despite its limited clinical value. The nu-
ances of the case concerning the particular treatments, however, led Lady Hale to
the conclusion that Jackson J had overlooked some aspects of the consequences
and burdens of some of the treatments. Moreover, notwithstanding the subjective in-
ﬂuence upon the question of futility, objective clinical appraisal of the burdens of
64. C Kitzinger and J Kitzinger ‘The “window of opportunity” for death after severe brain in-
jury: family experiences’ (2013) 35 Sociol of Health & Illness 1095.
65. The treatment in question was not ANH but invasive support for circulatory problems, renal
replacement therapy and CPR (in the event of cardiac arrest).
66. Aintree [2012] EWHC 3524 COP.
67. Aintree [2013] EWCA Civ 65.
68. Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Clarke, Lord Carnwath and Lord Hughes.
69. Aintree, above n 8, at [35].
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each treatment remained necessary and that as patients, ‘[W]e cannot always have
what we want’.70
Whether or not the above message has been received and wholly understood is per-
haps debatable, particularly in light of contemporary developments. English law does
not endorse the substituted judgement approach, in which the decision maker attempts
to step into the shoes of the patient.71 Best interests, at least in theory, remains an
objective question, with some very clear subjective elements that need to be considered
within that overall assessment. Nevertheless, the recent case of M v N,72 which repre-
sents the ﬁrst time in which a judge in the Court of Protection has countenanced the
withdrawal of ANH treatment from a patient in a MCS, seems to indicate that the ob-
jective component to the best interests assessment may be withering on the vine.
Hayden J, in concluding that the treatment could be withdrawn, seemed to justify his
decision solely by reference to what he thought the patient would have wanted to hap-
pen. In suggesting that there ‘was no prospect of her achieving a life that shewould con-
sider to be meaningful, worthwhile and digniﬁed’73 (emphasis of Hayden J) and that it
would be ‘disrespectful to preserve her further in a manner I think she would regard as
grotesque’74 (emphasis of Hayden J), there is clear evidence that the subjective views of
the patient were prioritised. In effect, his judgment was advocating a substituted judge-
ment approach in everything but name, at the expense of giving serious consideration to
any objective factors that may well have been relevant and could in fact have been
pulling in the opposite direction.75
While it is fair to say that we welcome the outcome in the case, to transform the best
interests assessment into a wholly subjective assessment is potentially problematic.
First, the substituted judgement approach is not always autonomy enhancing. This is
because in attempting to view things through the eyes of the patient, a judge is still
effectively reaching her own conclusions about what she thinks the patient would want
to happen. These are the judge’s views, not the patient’s.76 An inescapable conse-
quence of this is that in certain situations objective considerations may creep into a
judge’s reasoning and inﬂuence what she thinks about what the patient would want
to happen. Attempting to disguise this, via recourse to a notion of substituted judge-
ment, is dangerous and it is perhaps better that judges make overt reference to any
objective considerations within a more rounded balancing exercise.
Secondly, attempting to view things entirely from the patient’s perspective overlooks
the fact that in some cases there may well be objective evidence that is more compelling
70. Ibid, at [45]. This supports the decision in R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005]
EWCA Civ 1003 CA.
71. Substituted judgment is employed in some US jurisdictions. See In re Quinlan (1976) 355
A.2d 647; Cruzan v Director Missouri Department of Health (1990) 110 S Ct 2841 (USA
Supreme Court).
72. M v N, above n 8.
73. Per Hayden J in M v N, above n 8, at [74].
74. Per Hayden J in M v N, above n 8, at [75].
75. For another recent case in which signiﬁcant emphasis was placed on the subjective position
of the patient, see Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60; [2015] COPLR 843.
76. This is especially pertinent in the light of the UN Convention for the Rights of People with
Disability (UNCRPD), Art 12. This provision seeks to promote a ‘supported decision-making’
scheme for those who lack capacity, which creates a tension if the patient seems to prefer a course
of action that is not in his medical best interests. Also, if the patient is unable to communicate or
indicate any preference, it would appear to be effectively impossible to achieve ‘supported
decision-making’.
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and persuasive, and that could point in either direction if correctly reasoned. It is with
these above dangers in mind that reverence for life once again becomes useful, as it
would not seek to completely privilege any one approach and would encourage a more
holistic and balanced best interests assessment that takes all factors, both subjective and
objective, into account when determining whether there was enough evidence in a
given case to rebut the presumption in favour of life. Moreover, as one of us as argued
in more detail, a more expansive evaluation that considers the wider social issues
together with a more nuanced approach to questions of futility and intolerability is
necessary to avoid an overly medical, paternalistic approach.77
Reviewing other factually similar cases coming before the Court of Protection since
Aintree, the signs do indicate that judges are approaching the balancing exercise in a
more holistic manner. For example, in United Lincolnshire NHS Hospitals v N,78 the
court decided not to reinstate ANH for a woman whose feeding tube had become
dislodged and who was physically resistant to attempts to reinsert it. N was in a very
similar condition to M and, according to her next of kin, she would have found it an
affront to her dignity to be subjected to continued interventions to maintain her life
in that condition.79 Unlike M, however, N’s unequivocally negative physical response
to attempts to reinstate feeding seemed to indicate physical opposition to treatment, as
well as indicating that further attempts might be clinically unsuccessful and thus futile.
Accordingly, the court had more than N’s past expressions of preference to weigh in the
balancing exercise.
Also interesting is a case involving a minimally conscious man who was clinically
stable and whose partner and close friends gave evidence that clearly indicated he
would wish ANH to be withdrawn.80 Mr Justice Hayden was critical of the Ofﬁcial
Solicitor’s apparent reluctance to accept a more holistic approach to determining best
interests:
I must record that the Ofﬁcial Solicitor’s lawyers appear not to share my analysis of
the cogency and strength of TH’s wishes regarding his treatment. I confess that I have
found this surprising. If I may say so, they have not absorbed the full force of Lady
Hale’s judgment in Aintree and the emphasis placed on a ‘holistic’ evaluation when
assessing both ‘wishes and feelings’ and ‘best interests’.81
Ultimately, no decision was made at the time because the case was adjourned pend-
ing further medical evidence, yet we can detect in Hayden J’s words a clear willingness
to fully respect the patient’s autonomy and dignity, a position that he later concretely
reinforced in M v N.
In relation to assisted dying, the dilemma over preserving life is in some respects less
troubled when we know unquestionably that a person wants to die, provided, of course,
that they are able (and willing) to act alone. Here it could be reasonably argued that the
autonomous choice of the patient is all that counts, and that considerations in relation to
reverence’s rebuttable presumption are less relevant. If an informed and capacitous
patient has expressed a voluntary, clear and settled wish to die, it is of course within
77. R Heywood ‘Moving on from Bland: the evolution of the law and minimally conscious pa-
tients’ (2014) 22(4) Med L Rev 548–571.
78. [2014] EWCOP 16.
79. Ibid, at [29]–[33].
80. Shefﬁeld Teaching Hospital NHS Trust v TH and TR [2014] EWCOP 4.
81. Ibid, at [55].
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their reach to end their own life with the involvement of no one else should they wish to
do so. English law no longer criminalises suicide. Yet, some patients who have made a
decision to die will be physically incapable of taking their own life, for a variety of
reasons. In this scenario some type of assistance is required but, as English law
currently stands, no lawful help is permissible. Where the involvement of a third party
is required to assist another to die, arguably the debate concerning the appropriate role,
if any, of the criminal law moves more sharply into focus. It is here where reverence for
life, as a framework for locating the role of the criminal law, carries with it certain
advantages. Before we elaborate on these issues, we ﬁrst consider how the law has
recently dealt with cases involving active assistance.
(c) Nicklinson
The high-proﬁle case of Nicklinson primarily concerned the ban on encouraging or
assisting suicide under the Suicide Act 1961. The main appeal converged on the ongo-
ing development and possible expansion of the right of autonomy under Art 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.82 The appellants failed in their attempt to
persuade the majority of the Supreme Court that the blanket ban on assisting a suicide
was incompatible with Art 8 (1). However, in addition to those dissenting,83 three
Justices occupying what might be regarded as the middle ground in this case suggested
that a future attempt might be successful if Parliament failed to consider the ongoing
interference with autonomy in end-of-life issues,84 which is ﬁrmly established under
Art 8.85 A number of the Justices reﬂected on the diverse legal and moral arguments
that have shaped this debate, including the importance of the value of life.
Lord Neuberger considered various dimensions to the ‘sanctity’ or ‘primacy’ princi-
ple, as he put it, and how it relates to the ban on assisted suicide. In relation to the life of
a person seeking to die, he argued that the decriminalisation of suicide had substantially
undermined the principle, stating: ‘… if the primacy of human life does not prevent a
person committing suicide, it is difﬁcult to see why it should prevent that person seek-
ing assistance in committing suicide’.86 This point raises comparative questions of legal
and ethical consistency within the laws regulating death and the varied, often
conﬂicting, messages that such laws seem to convey. Concerns over inconsistency
and illogical distinctions permeate the end-of-life debate and the judgment in
Nicklinson reﬂects this. For example, comparing the appellants’ case to other end-of-
life dilemmas, Lord Neuberger suggested that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment
is a ‘more drastic interference in that person’s life and more extreme moral step’87 than
assisting in a suicide where the person wanting to die is clearly in command.
Here, Lord Neuberger neatly illustrates some of the difﬁculties that are associated
with substitute decision making in a situation where the patient lacks volition, as
opposed to those cases in which a patient is able to articulate a view. For him, it would
seem that having to make a decision that would end the life of a patient when it is not
82. See Nicklinson, Pretty and Purdy, above n 8.
83. Lady Hale and Lord Kerr.
84. See the judgments of Lord Neuberger, Lord Wilson and Lord Mance.
85. See eg Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33; Koch v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 6; and
Gross v Switzerland (2014) 58 EHRR 7.
86. Nicklinson, above n 8, at [90].
87. Ibid, at [94].
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possible to ascertain what that patient’s wishes would have been is of greater cause for
concern than those cases that rest on the expression of an autonomous wish of a
competent patient to receive assistance to die. It follows that reverence for life may
be more helpful, at least to Lord Neuberger, in cases where withdrawal of treatment
is the main issue, as it may provide some substantial guidance as to when any pre-
sumption in favour of preserving life could be reasonably rebutted. Yet, that is not
to say that reverence is incapable of providing some useful guidance as to when it
may be appropriate for the law to tolerate certain types of assistance in situations
where patients have requested it, and we elaborate on this in our principled approach
subheading below.
Lady Hale expressed similar concerns when she compared the request made by the
late Mr Nicklinson and Paul Lamb to other end-of-life decisions, such as Ms B’s
successful appeal to have life-sustaining ventilation withdrawn in order to allow her
to die.88 Commenting that although the acts/omissions distinction sanctioned by the
House of Lords in Blandmakes some legal sense, Lady Hale observed that it must often
make little sense to those affected who are denied a choice.89
We can thus see that while the various issues that speak to assisted dying and treatment
withdrawal cases perhaps raise different issues at ﬁrst blush, in so far as the value of hu-
man life is a central feature in both types of case, they remain irrevocably intertwined.
This is especially so when fundamental concerns about safeguarding the vulnerable
are considered. To the extent that the objection to legal assisted dying rests on concerns
over preserving other human lives, Lord Neuberger suggested that it does little more ‘…
than replicate concerns about the lives of the weak and vulnerable’.90 Lord Neuberger
was also inﬂuenced by an argument previously used by another assisted dying litigant,
Debbie Purdy.91 Agreeing that concerns about legal change based on the sanctity of life
can be reversed, he pointed out that evidence shows that ‘some people with a progres-
sive degenerative disease feel themselves forced to end their lives before they would
wish to’,92 while still able to act alone. Thus, Lord Neuberger argued, the blanket
ban ‘may serve to cut short their lives’.93 Similar concerns were evident when Lord
Neuberger mentioned the shortcomings of the current approach, which leans against
prosecution and offers only retrospective assessment of the victim’s circumstances
and reasons for wanting to die once it is too late to prevent the suicide.94
The importance of the value of life emerged repeatedly and, coincidentally, Lord
Sumption spoke of ‘reverence for human life for its own sake’.95 Lady Hale alluded to
the religious foundation of the principle, stating that ‘respect for the intrinsic value of
all human life is probably the most important value in Judaeo-Christian morality’.96
This, she suggested, should absolutely justify refusing to oblige a person to help another
to commit suicide, but it would not ‘so obviously justify prohibiting those who freely
88. See B v NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam); [2002] 2 All ER 449.
89. Nicklinson, above n 8, at [302]–[304]; and Bland, above n 8.
90. See Nicklinson, above n 8. Lord Kerr agreed with Neuberger regarding the logic of using
the sanctity argument to prevent those who need assistance while those able to act independently
are not prevented [358].
91. Purdy, above n 8.
92. Nicklinson, above n 8, at [96].
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid, at [108].
95. Ibid, at [209].
96. Ibid, at [311].
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judged that, in the circumstances of a particular case, there was no moral impediment to
their assisting suicide’.97
This view accords with Lady Hale’s earlier House of Lords’ judgment in Purdy,98 in
which she clearly identiﬁed the competing interests that collide with maintaining a
respect for the intrinsic value of human life above all else. She acknowledged the
tension in stating that ‘it is not for society to tell people what to value about their
own lives. But it may be justiﬁable for society to insist that we value their lives even
if they do not.’99 This clear recognition of the value of human life in society was
somewhat tempered though by the fact that she suggested elsewhere in her judgment
that ‘if we are serious about protecting autonomy we have to accept that autonomous
individuals have different views about what makes their lives worth living’.100 This
highlights both the tension between these competing ethical concerns and the
importance of establishing a compromise between valuing human life and valuing
autonomy.
Interestingly, Lady Hale stressed that it was important that some attention was paid
to the reasons why a person wished to be helped to end his or her life.101 For her,
then, it seems clear that there may be some situations in which preserving life at
all costs on the basis that it has an intrinsic value is not a desirable position for
the law to adopt. Factors pertaining to why the patient may be requesting assistance
could be sufﬁciently convincing so as not to warrant prosecution if such assistance is
in fact provided.
Such willingness to open the door to rebutting the presumption in favour of life,
for a person whose Art 8 rights are engaged and who wishes to receive assistance
in suicide, seems to represent a signiﬁcant development in judicial thinking. In
weighing the presumption for life against other fundamental ethical concerns (mainly
autonomy, but also dignity), several members of the Supreme Court have provided
guidance for Parliament or even for future cases. While the most recent discussions
in the House of Commons indicate that legislative reform is not imminent102 –
primarily, it seems, because of the possible danger for vulnerable people – the
amendments to the Assisted Dying Bill103 in the House of Lords demonstrated that
resolving the valid competing concerns is challenging but not impossible.104 By
offering a more principled approach to rebutting the presumption in favour of
preserving life, the reverence principle is capable of addressing such challenges.
Thus, in the ﬁnal section of this paper, we summarise recent developments in relation
to treatment withdrawal, before tentatively suggesting a more progressive and consis-
tent approach in assisted dying cases.
97. Ibid.
98. Purdy, above n 8.
99. Ibid, at [68].
100. Ibid, at [66].
101. Ibid, at [68].
102. The Assisted Dying (No. 2) Bill, MP Rob Marris’ private member’s bill – which, like the
recent HL Bill (below) sought to legalise physician-assisted suicide (PAS) for terminally ill, men-
tally competent people expected to die naturally within 6months –was defeated at second reading
on 11 September 2015.
103. House of Lords Bill (24 (2013), 6 (2014)). The Bill reached Committee Stage before par-
liamentary time elapsed; however, it is signiﬁcant that some of the debates reﬂected an appreci-
ation of the judgment in Nicklinson.
104. See Hansard HL Deb, vol 756, cols 1851–1898, 7 November 2014; and cols 1001–1047,
16 January 2015.
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REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION: REVERENCE NOT SANCTITY?
Coherent and ethically acceptable principles have developed in relation to certain
questions about life and death. We know conclusively that a competent adult has
an inviolable right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.105 This right to die via with-
drawal can extend to those who create a legally valid AD, and to those in a vegeta-
tive state, despite the argument that removing life-sustaining sustenance in such
circumstances may be regarded as indistinguishable from euthanasia.106 Rebutting
the presumption in favour of life for those in MCS or a similar condition will often
hinge on a best interests evaluation, which has been subject to signiﬁcant judicial
discretion. The decision in Aintree has conﬁrmed that the test as to what is a worth-
while treatment must be inﬂuenced by the patient’s wishes, thus ﬁnally providing a
more satisfactory interpretation of the relevant provision of the Mental Capacity Act
2005.107
Moreover, questions of the burdens and beneﬁts of treatment, together with assessing
the experiences of the patient, unavoidably, and rightly, involve certain quality-of-life
determinations. Accordingly, the principle of preserving life needs to holistically reﬂect
these wider concerns in a coherent and principled fashion. Each case will be decided on
its individual facts but we can, and should, endeavour to have a consistent and ethically
sound approach. If the early indicators from the cases discussed above prove to reﬂect
the general post-Aintree approach, we may be satisﬁed that the Supreme Court in
Aintree has done enough to sustain a more ethically coherent approach that properly
recognises the importance of the patient’s subjective preferences and values within a
holistic methodology for determining best interests, albeit in the wake of M v N there
ought to be a degree of caution so as to ensure that it does not swing too far in one
direction.
Cases concerning active interventions foreshortening life, however, remain in thrall
to sanctity concerns and, understandably, the courts have been anxious to avoid allega-
tions of usurping parliamentary sovereignty. But as Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale
indicated in Nicklinson, other ethical concerns should be regarded as equally (and
sometimes more) important than traditional sanctity considerations in order to facilitate
a more subtle approach to this dilemma. In Bland, Lord Goff argued that the right to
self-determination should not be eclipsed by the fact of incompetence.108 Similarly,
we question whether this right must continue to be eclipsed by the fact of physical
inability to end one’s own life by active measures. Notwithstanding the importance
of protecting the vulnerable, the recognition of the autonomous right of the competent
individual to choose death in order to avoid terrible suffering should lead to a more
nuanced and sensitive approach from the law. Thus a powerful imperative to develop
a more coherent and principled approach regarding the presumption in favour of
preserving life emerges.
105. B v NHS Trust, above n 88.
106. See eg JK Mason and GT Laurie Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9th edn, 2013) p 549; and D Orentlicher ‘The alleged distinc-
tion between euthanasia and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment: conceptually incoherent
and impossible to maintain’ (2012) 1998 U Ill L Rev 837.
107. Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(6)(a)–(c).
108. Bland, above n 8, at 866.
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DEVISING A MORE PRINCIPLED APPROACH
The ﬁnal section of this paper will begin to suggest an approach that accommodates, to
an extent, ethical principles such as dignity and autonomy, while protecting the vulner-
able and maintaining that life is presumed to be intrinsically valuable according to the
reverence principle. Devising a principled approach to rebutting the presumption for
life preservation ﬁrst requires some consideration of what we understand in relation
to dignity and autonomy, and in particular the law’s relationship with autonomy. This
is vital in order to address how reverence for life may be construed as a framework that
correlates with the criminal law.
Principles of dignity and autonomy are notoriously ambiguous and subject to diverse
and mercurial interpretations;109 nevertheless, we attempt a necessarily brief explora-
tion in the context of reverence, beginning with dignity.
Mary Neal’s work is useful in drawing from the conﬂicting accounts within the law
and academic literature in order to consider the challenges of understanding dignity as a
concept or principle, an intrinsic human value, a virtue, a norm and/or a right.110
Dignity’s ‘messy appeal’, according to Neal, is that ‘the idea of dignity attracts us by
seeming to chime with some of our ethical intuitions, but as we attempt to analyse it,
we come up against an array of possible meanings’.111 Such ambiguity means that it
is problematic to attempt to effectively deploy dignity in ethico-legal dilemmas, but
we suggest that there is a meaningful concept of dignity in relation to assisted dying.
We agree with Neal that to conﬂate dignity with autonomy (using Kantian principles)
only accounts for a segment of dignity’s potential application. Dignity is not essentially
synonymous with autonomy, yet, where assisted dying is concerned, the two seem
invariably connected.
Where a competent adult expresses an autonomous desire to die rather than to
continue to endure what they regard as an undigniﬁed and unendurably unpleasant or
painful existence, or to avoid what is likely to be – according to their understanding
– an undigniﬁed dying process, dignity and autonomy seem to be conjoined. The
way in which a person values their life, both physically and biographically, is often con-
nected to the way in which that person understands and values their human dignity. This
is necessarily nuanced and subjective, yet the narratives behind the important legal
challenges (Pretty, Purdy, Nicklinson),112 suggest that people who seek death in this
context share a similar perception of the relationship between autonomy and dignity.
Indeed, the ‘right to a digniﬁed death’ is the primary campaigning slogan of the main
109. See eg LR Kass ‘Death with dignity and the sanctity of life’ in BS Kogan (ed) A Time to be
Born and a Time to Die: the Ethics of Choice (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991) p 117; R
Macklin ‘Dignity is a useless concept: it means no more than respect for persons or their auton-
omy’ (2003) 327(7429) Br Med J 1419; D Schroeder ‘Dignity: Two riddles and four concepts’
(2008) 17(2), Camb Q Healthcare Ethics 230; G Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); O O’Neill Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); S McLean Assisted Dying: Reﬂections on the
Need for Law Reform (London: Routledge, 2007).
110. See M Neal ‘Respect for human dignity as “substantive basic norm”’ (2014) 10 Int’l J Law
in Context 26; M Neal ‘Dignity, law and language-games’ (2012) 25 Int’l J for Semiotics L –
Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 107; M Neal ‘“Not gods but animals”: human
dignity and vulnerable subjecthood’ (2012) 33 Liverpool L Rev 177.
111. Ibid, Neal ‘Human dignity and vulnerable subjecthood’, at 179.
112. Above n 8.
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organisation pushing for legal change in the UK.113 And in jurisdictions where PAS is
legal, notions of autonomy and dignity seem crucial to those seeking PAS.114
With respect to autonomy per se, its compatibility with reverence for life is a little
more difﬁcult to articulate. This tension is born out of a problem that we made explicit
reference to earlier; arguments in favour of relying on reverence for life are more con-
vincing where a patient is in a PVS or MCS and lacks capacity, as opposed to where a
patient can express her own wishes. If a patient is capable of competently expressing a
clear and settled wish to die, it may reasonably be suggested by some that all other
considerations become redundant and that there is no need for recourse to reverence’s
purported compromise. Effectively, there would be no need to introduce any objective
considerations into the equation that may point in the direction of preserving life
because autonomy should prevail. With this in mind, it is sometimes difﬁcult to
conceive of a compromise between giving effect to autonomy on the one hand, and
any objective valuing of life on the other. The arguments are often presented as polar
opposites and the accusation could be made that in embracing some objective consid-
erations when assessing the value of life, reverence for life actually privileges preserva-
tion of life in a way that is not dissimilar to sanctity and inviolability.
This overlooks certain key features of the suggested role of reverence. First, it fails to
recognise that reverence only purports to offer a framework in which the criminal law
can be located and, secondly, that viewing reverence as a framework is the very thing
that allows it to neatly capture how the law treats and respects certain autonomous de-
cisions. The law respects and permits certain autonomous choices, but there are limits to
the extent that it does so; the conception of reverence offered here reﬂects this, and so
ﬁts neatly into the structure of the criminal law.115 It does not privilege preservation of
life over autonomy, but it does take as its starting point the recognition of the intrinsic
value of all life, and its default position is that life should therefore be protected and pre-
served. However, it also accepts that in certain situations factors will be present that
would cause that presumption in favour of preserving life to be rebutted and so would
allow certain patients the right to receive assistance to die, and would not penalise that
patient or indeed any individual who provided the assistance.
Thus, if a patient made an autonomous request to receive assistance to die, reverence
would not automatically support the criminal law countenancing that choice, without
certain ‘other’ factors being present that were sufﬁciently convincing to rebut rever-
ence’s presumption in favour of life. If, however, those factors were present, reverence
would support the criminal law in respecting the patient’s autonomous choice. An
autonomous wish, in the context of reverence, could therefore be described as necessary
but not sufﬁcient to prevent the criminal law from intervening in respect of every occur-
rence of assisted suicide.
By way of example, both authors would favour a more permissive law in respect of
PAS. However, neither of us would feel comfortable in supporting a situation in which
113. Dignity in Dying, see http://www.dignityindying.org.uk/about-us/ (accessed 14 February
2016).
114. See eg S Fischer et al ‘Reasons why people in Switzerland seek assisted suicide: the view of
patients and physicians’ (2009) 139 Swiss Med Weekly 333; CDM Ruijs et al ‘Unbearable suf-
fering and requests for euthanasia prospectively studied in end-of-life cancer patients in primary
care’ (2014) 13(1) BMC Palliative Care 62.
115. For two interesting decisions that illustrate the extent to which the criminal law permits au-
tonomous choice in relation to certain activities, but not others, see R v Wilson [1997] QB 47; R v
Brown and Others [1994] 1AC 212.
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medical assistance could be provided, without any legal ramiﬁcations, for example, to
an 18-year-old patient who sought to end his life simply because he was feeling miser-
able that he had just been rejected by his girlfriend. His choice may well be autonomous
in the sense that he has concluded that his life is no longer of value, and he may well
have made a settled and informed choice, but reverence would not support his purported
autonomous choice as being one that is capable of rebutting the presumption in favour
of preserving life. In short, reverence would require something more for the law to give
effect to the autonomous wish of the patient.
With this in mind, change the above hypothetical scenario slightly. Our patient is
now a 50-year-old man who has requested assistance to die because of mounting
suffering and (what he sees as) indignity as a result of motor neurone disease, which
is an incurable, degenerative disease. In this scenario, his autonomous wish, coupled
with the objective factors that are present as a result of his condition, may bring him
within the reach of reverence supporting a choice to receive assistance to die, provided
that those objective factors were deemed sufﬁcient to rebut the presumption in support
of maintaining life.
We now begin to see that reverence could equally have a role in active assistance
cases as well as in withdrawal cases by functioning within a system of law that respects
certain choices made by individuals, but not every choice, especially where there may
be a strong justiﬁcation for impinging on that choice. It is in this respect that considering
certain objective factors in any assessment of the value of life could usefully operate as
an appropriate counterbalance to safeguard against exploitation of the vulnerable, to
prevent instances of assisted suicide from becoming too commonplace in society and
thus spiralling out of control, and to not diminish completely the importance of
recognising, at least to an extent, the intrinsic value of life. A corollary of this concep-
tion of reverence is that, in the same way that some objective determinations are needed
to weigh up where the presumption in favour of preserving life could be rebutted in
MCS/PVS cases, so too does some emphasis need to be placed on objective factors
in active assistance cases. In the context of active assistance, identifying precisely what
objective factors ought to be taken into account, and the emphasis that should be placed
on them, is certainly problematic. Thus, it becomes essential to at least make some
attempt to deﬁne what may amount to appropriate criteria that may be capable of rebut-
ting any presumption for life.
Needless to say, agreeing the criteria for eligibility for an assisted death is no easy
task. If terminal illness expected to prove imminently fatal is the requirement, many
people, such as the appellants inNicklinson, will not qualify. Alternatively, if eligibility
rests on an assessment of the extent and intractability of suffering, there will be con-
cerns that the lives of the seriously ill and disabled might be seen as less valued and
so the system put in place would need to include safeguards to avoid this. Discussion
of exactly what this criteria should demand is beyond the scope of this paper, yet we
agree with Lady Hale that ‘it would not be beyond the wit of a legal system to devise
a process for identifying those people, those few people, who should be allowed help
to end their own lives’.116 Lady Hale suggested four essential requirements: capacity,
no undue inﬂuence, full knowledge of their situation (the options available and
consequences of the decision) and ﬁnally, the person must be unable, due to physical
incapacity or frailty, to act alone.117
116. Nicklinson, above n 8, at [314].
117. Ibid.
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Difﬁculties arise, however, where one of the qualifying factors would rest on the patient
being physically incapable of acting alone. This requirement is problematic for two rea-
sons. First, if this factor became a prerequisite for the non-prosecution of anyone who pro-
vided assistance, it might result in many patients having to postpone a decision to end their
life until the point at which they could not actually act themselves. For some diseases, such
as cancer, this point might not come until the closing weeks or days of life, which might
subject the patient to prolonged pain and suffering. This may be an unintended, and indeed
undesirable, consequence of including this particular qualifying criterion. As it stands,
some patients seek to avoid this very situation by requesting assistance to end their own
lives at an earlier point, before they become completely dependent on others, so that they
can avoid the discomfort, indignity and trauma that will occur in the latter stages of certain
illnesses. It follows that some patients will simply ‘desire’ assisted suicide at an early stage
in proceedings, rather than actually ‘requiring’ it at a point at which they can no longer act
themselves. Insisting that a patient has to be unable to act alone before the law will allow
assistancewould therefore be problematic.Many patientswho simply desire an earlier dig-
niﬁed death, and who seek the help of someone to facilitate this either by travelling with
them, or by making arrangements for them in some other way, as frequently happens at
present, would fall outside the scope of the qualifying criteria and thus would not trigger
reverence’s rebuttable presumption. This could well have the effect of causing those who
have provided the assistance to be prosecuted more frequently than is currently the case.
A second concern is that this requirement suggests that those able to act alone can
take matters into their own hands by committing suicide unaided. Given that taking
one’s own life can be difﬁcult, with a risk of botched attempts or resorting to violent
means of dying and additional distress for all involved, we see a further justiﬁcation
for avoiding the requirement of physical inability to act alone.
In the light of the above, we tentatively suggest that Lady Hale’s ﬁnal requirement be
replaced with the need for a recognised medical condition that is permanent, irreversible
and/or degenerative, and that has the potential to cause the patient pain, suffering and in-
dignity if their life is prolonged unreasonably. The existence of such a condition would
need to be certiﬁed by two medical professionals. This would avoid treating those with
a physical disability differently, while also ensuring that the person has legitimate medical
grounds to justify assistance. Once determined and assessed, these conditions should be
capable of rebutting the presumption for life preservation. Accordingly, if a patient satis-
ﬁed the objective criteria that we would stipulate, and we acknowledge that the precise
contours of this would need to be debated in greater depth, then any compassionate assis-
tance provided by a third party to help a patient travel abroad to receive an assisted death
should not be prosecuted. Alternatively, if legislationwere enacted to introduce a regulated
yet permissive medicalised model of PAS, which in the current climate seems unlikely,
then patients who meet the criteria should be entitled to receive medical assistance to
die, and any doctor who has operated within the provisions of the legislation should be im-
mune from prosecution for complying with that request.
Rebutting the presumption for life in order to allow any overt assisted dying will, of
course, raise many objections, not least from within the medical profession, who,
collectively, have traditionally opposed any legal change that might be seen to erode
the ethic of ‘caring not killing’.118 Accordingly, the autonomy of those called upon
118. See eg the British Medical Association’s Policy on assisted dying, available at http://bma.
org.uk/practical-support-at-work/ethics/bma-policy-assisted-dying (accessed 14 February 2016),
and Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Committee Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill
tteeics/bma-po (2005) at 42.
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to provide assistance must be taken into account. Any lawful assisted dying should
recognise a professional right to conscientiously (and sensitively) exempt oneself from
participating in PAS,119 although this right should not allow the medical professionals
to abandon patients seeking PAS. It is also important to note that professional medical
cooperation and acceptance of PAS will assist in creating the best procedures to ensure
that patients are properly cared for within a system that succeeds in safeguarding the
vulnerable. Evidence indicates that physical pain is often the most important reason
for seeking death,120 thus professional involvement will be essential to ensure that
people seeking PAS are aware of all the facts, especially other options to alleviate
suffering.
Having suggested that greater recognition of dignity and autonomy together with
carefully constructed criteria and a process for rebutting the presumption for life
could pave the way for a more coherent, consistent and ethical approach, we have
left a number of questions unanswered. Some of these include, inter alia, deﬁning
precisely when and why the presumption should be rebutted in differing scenarios.
In the above discussion, we have offered some examples of where we think it may
have been appropriate for this to happen, but they are by no means intended to be
an exhaustive list. The principal advantage of adopting reverence would be its ﬂuid,
fact-sensitive nature and so opinions and beliefs as to when and why the presumption
should be rebutted will naturally vary. Therefore, as a body of case-law builds up, it
would be of paramount importance to analyse the type of factual scenarios that would
warrant considering a departure from the presumption in favour of life and the
amount and type of evidence that would be needed in order for the rebuttal to
actually bite.
A number of inextricably linked further points ﬂow from this. How would the frame-
work of reverence provide adequate protection for the vulnerable individuals in
society? Given that this has proven to be the dominant concern for English law in the
end-of-life debate, some serious thought would need to be given as to how, if indeed
it all, it would be possible to placate those who viewed this as a source of anxiety. More-
over, there is the time-honoured argument of the slippery slope that is bound to rear its
head in opposition. Critics will no doubt point out that if judges are too quick to rebut
the presumption, then the importance of presumption itself may be eroded and this
would do untold damage to recognising the intrinsic value of life, and in turn the law’s
main priority of preserving life. Clearly, then, there would need to be some guidance as
to the exercise, and limits, of judicial ﬂexibility in interpreting the concept of reverence.
These questions are, however, impossible to determine at present, for to answer them
would require reverence to be adopted in contemporary legal parlance. This in itself
raises a key concern of how judges could be encouraged to incorporate reverence for
life and to inject it into mainstream judicial reasoning in a way that does more than
simply portray it as yet another mere variance in phraseology, by presenting it, and
using it, in the principled way that has been suggested.
If those questions can be answered to provide a model that adequately safe-
guards the vulnerable while maintaining a strong presumption in favour of life, a
more coherent, consistent, ethical and secular approach may be identiﬁed. Thus
119. For a discussion, see R Huxtable and A Mullock ‘Voices of discontent? Conscience, com-
promise and assisted dying’ (2015) 23 Med L Rev 242.
120. Fischer et al, above n 114, at 333; Ruijs et al, above n 113.
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reverence could provide an ethically sound and coherent compromise between the
argument that life is intrinsically sacred or inviolable and the quality-of-life
position.
CONCLUSION
We sit on a ‘perilous perch’ regarding the endless battles about the intrinsic value of
life.121 Religious doctrines enshrining the ‘sanctity’ of life invoke connotations that
do not reﬂect the concerns of a pluralistic and predominantly secular society.
Furthermore, as Price argued, sanctity may be a ‘hazardous distraction’, and ‘[R]espect
for speciﬁc patients not the sanctity of life is the proper legal and ethical
guide’.122 While the concept of sanctity has evolved to encompass the alternative prin-
ciple of inviolability, this too provides a limited and theoretically ﬂawed approach to
this dilemma. Inviolability purports to cast off religious baggage yet causes confusion
over possible interpretations of treatment and futility and suffers from too heavy a reli-
ance on double effect, which may be seen as a ‘sop’, rather than a sound way to limit
any tendency towards vitalism. Both concepts offer an incoherent and sometimes
highly discretionary approach that has generally encouraged an overly paternalistic
attitude. Searching for an alternative, ‘respect’ for life seems inadequate for a strong
presumption in favour of life. Lord Neuberger’s reference to ‘primacy’might be useful
in providing a simple numerical expression conveying importance while avoiding
being value-laden, yet we question whether a term so devoid of ethical signiﬁcance
is desirable. Does the concept of reverence for life assist us, then, in ﬁnding a principled
compromise and a more coherent approach?
Inevitably, there may be cynicism about the addition of yet another ambiguous
term into the never-ending debate concerning the intrinsic value of human life. There
is also the pragmatic question of whether in fact reverence would change anything at
all in terms of outcomes in these hard cases. We have suggested that, if incorporated,
it may well have the effect of altering the outcome in certain cases. While we would
both agree that signiﬁcant inroads were made by judges in the end-of-life cases such
as Bland, Purdy and Aintree (at least in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court),
we would argue that in other contemporary cases such as W v M and others, Aintree
in the Court of Protection, and even Nicklinson in the Supreme Court, the use of rev-
erence for life may have helped to hone the restrictive nature of some of the judicial
reasoning. Reverence, as we conceive it, may have helped to focus the minds of cer-
tain judges so that they were more acutely aware of the fact if the evidence was com-
pelling enough, they were entitled to become unshackled from the narrow view that
the law should be predominantly concerned with preserving life at all costs because
the intrinsic value of life is sacrosanct. As more and more difﬁcult cases come before
the courts concerning MCS patients or, indeed, those suffering from terminal, degen-
erative conditions who request active assistance to die, the embedded notion of a
rebuttal presumption may have a direct bearing by leading to a more compassionate
and humane outcome in certain situations. The recent defeat of Rob Marris’ Assisted
Dying Bill in the House of Commons indicates that the courts will again be called
121. Brazier and Ost, above n 4, p 83.
122. D Price ‘My view of the sanctity of life: a rebuttal of John Keown’s critique’ (2007) 27 Le-
gal Stud 549.
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upon to resolve the tension between the rather nebulous autonomous rights protected
by Art 8 ECHR and the need to preserve life for vulnerable people. Moreover, as the
law seems to be developing incrementally to give greater respect to the right to
autonomy in the medical context,123 a patient-centric approach that includes certain
objective considerations, which can be justiﬁed in order to protect the vulnerable,
seems appropriate.
Accordingly, we are of the view that Brazier and Ost mean reverence for life to be
something more than just a linguistic alternative. The idea has a much greater potential
in so far as it conveys importance to humanity, offering a less absolute position that re-
ﬂects the rebuttable presumption for preserving life in a way that might be developed as
a coherent compromise between sanctity, inviolability and concerns about autonomy,
dignity and the quality of life.
123. Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] AC 1430.
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